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Risky Behavior among Youths
Some Issues from
Behavioral Economics
Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin
The goal of this volume is to provide an economic analysis of risky behav-
ior among youths, loosely deﬁned to be behavior by people under age nine-
teen that might have important future ramiﬁcations. Examples of such
behaviors include smoking, drinking, having unprotected sex, and engag-
ing in crime. The traditional approach used by economists would seem
to have important shortcomings in this realm. The rational-choice model
provides a powerful tool for understanding behavior and has yielded an
array of insights across a broad range of human activities. But a growing
number of economists have come to recognize that the rational-choice
model is inaccurate in some systematic and important ways, and that to
take full advantage of the economic insights and methodology, economists
must embrace insights from psychology and other social sciences so as to
make our models more relevant and realistic.
While the shortcomings of the rational-choice model are relevant for
people of all ages, they seem particularly acute for youths. In this chapter,
we discuss how recent eﬀorts combining psychology and economics can
be used to help understand risky behavior by adolescents. We are not (in
the least) experts in youthful risky behavior and do not provide a very
broad perspective on all the psychology relevant to this topic. Our goal
here is less ambitious and more speciﬁc: to explore what some of the main
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Rabin thanks the Russell Sage, Alfred P. Sloan, and MacArthur Foundations.insights and issues raised by recent research in behavioral economics sug-
gest about risky behavior by adolescents.1 Our focus is on the potential for
applying formal behavioral-economic models to theoretical and empirical
research on youthful behavior.
Why should economists be motivated to study risky behavior among
youths? It could be that we have only a “positive” interest—we are inter-
ested merely because we would like to understand society better and esti-
mate or predict drug use, criminal behavior, suicide, and so forth. For most
people, however, the interest in youths’ behavior is motivated by “norma-
tive” considerations. Parents, citizens, policy makers, and even many econ-
omists are interested not merely in predicting whether sixteen-year-olds
start smoking, use cocaine, get pregnant, or kill themselves, but also in un-
derstanding the welfare consequences of these behaviors.
One important normative question is whether risky behavior among
youths creates negative externalities that aﬀect other members of society.
Negative externalities are obviously an important facet of many of the
behaviors studied in this volume—for example, crime, or such behaviors
as alcohol and drug use that can lead to crime and automobile accidents,
or any behavior that leads to increased dependence on the state. Similarly,
a major concern in preventing early pregnancy among girls is the harm
done to society (and to the children born). A reasonable guess is that
youths have a higher preference than adults for activities that create nega-
tive externalities and that society may therefore be especially keen to cur-
tail these activities.
But, clearly, most of us are concerned about risky adolescent behavior
in large part because we believe that adolescents are not behaving in their
own best interests and because we feel that something should be done to
help them. This concern is warranted by the clear evidence that even adults
often do not behave in their own best interests. Of course, even if this
concern motivates our research, we could help study suicide, drug use, sex,
and so forth without taking an explicit stand on whether these behaviors
are good or bad and then let policy makers and other audiences use our
behavioral conclusions to further their normative concerns. We intend that
this chapter help in this way. We believe, however, that behavioral econom-
ics provides some valuable insights into the precise nature of the harm that
youths may cause themselves, and, hence, the most central contribution of
behavioral economics may be helping policy makers understand the con-
nection between behavior and welfare. This will be our main emphasis.
Our welfare emphasis may be controversial. Over the years, economists
have developed an aggressive agnosticism with regard to welfare analysis
for individual choice, refusing to make any judgments that people are not
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1. For a general overview of some of the topics studied by behavioral economics, see Thaler
(1992), Camerer (1995), and Rabin (1998).behaving in their own best interests. Caution is, of course, warranted be-
cause, more often than not, people probably have a better idea of what is
in their own best interests than do economists, other social scientists, and
policy makers. But this caution has largely transformed itself into an a
priori presumption that people always behave in their own best interest.
There are some realms where common sense, compassion, and intellectual
curiosity all tell us that we should consider the possibility that people may
not be behaving in their own best interests. Risky behavior by youths is
one of those realms.2
Of course, we should not replace welfare agnosticism with a “promiscu-
ous paternalism” that provides undisciplined assertions that others’ behav-
iors are not good for them and that we know better what they should do.
Rather, we need a principled way in which to study when and how people
make errors, what types of interventions might help mitigate these errors,
and when we can have some conﬁdence that these interventions help more
than they harm. When considering risky behavior among youths, it is im-
portant to avoid both opinionated moralism as to what is the right behav-
ior and naive faith that sixteen-year-olds make no predictable mistakes
in their choices. By identifying systematic patterns in errors that people
make, behavioral economics provides just such an approach.
The development of behavioral economics has not been targeted at an-
alyzing the behavior of adolescents. The literature has developed with a
belief that people make errors at all ages. It is, indeed, worth stressing the
similarities in the mistakes made at diﬀerent ages. A ﬁfty-year-old may
sacriﬁce too much for sexual gratiﬁcation just as a ﬁfteen-year-old may, or
a thirty-six-year-old may drive too soon after drinking just as a sixteen-
year-old may. Errors associated in the common imagination with one’s
youth are often made throughout life, and bad decisions attributed to
youth may not be as strongly associated with age as is often claimed.3
That said, there are likely broad diﬀerences between adolescents and
adults in many of the realms that we discuss. Young people almost surely
make more mistakes. In section 1.1, we brieﬂy discuss psychological evi-
dence on how youths make decisions and how youths diﬀer from adults.
As we proceed, we shall relate some of our theoretical analysis back to
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2. Given our focus on welfare, we shall not devote this essay to proving beyond (an econo-
mist’s) doubt that behavior predicted outside the rational-choice framework is fundamentally
inconsistent with rational choice. We doubt the general usefulness of the widespread method-
ology of employing post hoc attempts to ﬁt behavior into the rational-choice framework
without any inquiry as to whether it is the correct explanation. In making welfare assess-
ments, this approach is clearly inappropriate.
3. This interpretation has been endorsed by some of the leading political ﬁgures of our day.
As many of those attacking Bill Clinton for lying about his extramarital aﬀairs were exposed
fortheirownmisbehavior,youthfulindiscretionbecamesomethingofacatchphraseforbadbe-
havioratvirtuallyanyage.Thisis,e.g.,preciselythetermthatseventy-four-year-oldCongress-
man Henry Hyde used to describe the extramarital aﬀair he had had at age forty-one.this evidence, but more often we speculate on how some of the obvious
but little-researched diﬀerences between youths and adults relate to the
behavioral phenomena that we consider.
Before proceeding to this evidence, however, we brieﬂy outline the other
sections of this chapter. We focus on three types of questions that can all
be usefully thought of in terms of their relation to a rational-choice base
model. Throughout the chapter, we assume that a person’s overall well-
being is determined by adding up her well-being at each moment. We refer
to a person’s well-being in period t as her instantaneous utility in period t,
w h i c hw ed e n o t eb yut. To allow for the possibility that the person’s instan-
taneous utility in period t is stochastic, let St be the set of possible states
for period t,a n df o rs  St,l e tpt(, s)a n dut(, s) be the probability of
state s and instantaneous utility function in state s, respectively. The per-
son’s expected instantaneous utility in period t is therefore sSt pt(, s)
ut(, s). Finally, we assume that the person’s overall well-being from the
perspective of period t, which we denote by Wt,i sg i v e nb y
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Section 1.2 is devoted to discounting. The reader will notice that our
base model assumes no discounting: the expected instantaneous utilities
for all periods are weighted equally. We begin our discussion in section 1.2
by arguing that, from a normative perspective, there should be no dis-
counting. Just because an adolescent cares very little for her thirty-ﬁve-
year-old self, it does not follow that we should care very little for her thirty-
ﬁve-year-old self. We then discuss some recent approaches that formalize
the ways in which people underweight the future consequences of their
actions and the lessons that such approaches have for youthful behavior.
We discuss excessive myopia per se (pure underweighting of the future)
and the tendency to have a time-inconsistent preference for immediate
gratiﬁcation (pursuing immediate gratiﬁcation on a moment-by-moment
basis in a way that does not match the person’s own long-run best inter-
ests). We also discuss the closely related error of overoptimism about fu-
ture self-control problems, which implies an underestimate of future mis-
behavior.
Section 1.3 discusses ways in which people incorrectly predict future
instantaneous utilities. Hence, while section 1.2 explores ways in which
people pay too little attention to the future consequences of their actions,
section 1.3 explores ways in which people incorrectly predict how they will
feel in the future about those consequences. We describe some systematic
ways in which youths may underestimate the future harm caused by their
current behavior because they do not fully recognize the extent of day-to-
day ﬂuctuations in tastes, or the extent to which peer pressure will tempo-
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older will diﬀer from their youthful preferences.
In section 1.4, we discuss some issues with respect to the probability
function p, focusing on the logic of repeated risky choices. Since both past
and future risky behavior may change the consequences of current risky
behavior—in particular, behaving in a risky way at other times may aﬀect
the marginal risk accrued by behaving in a risky way now—certain types
of risky behavior can be understood only in an intertemporal context. We
ﬂesh out the logic of repeated risky choices largely in a rational-choice
setting but then explore how those implications might diﬀer when people
make errors in assessing risks, have self-control problems, or incorrectly
predict their own future preferences.
We conclude in section 1.5 with a more general discussion of the issues
raised and lessons learned from the analysis in this chapter.
1.1 Evidence on Adolescent Decision Making
In this section, we review some evidence from psychology and related
ﬁelds concerning how youths make decisions and how youths diﬀer from
adults.
The paradigm of psychological research most closely related to the eco-
nomic approach is behavioral decision theory, which examines people’s
actual decision-making processes and how these compare to “normative”
(Bayesian) decision making. Behavioral decision theory often breaks down
decision making into a sequence of steps so that performance on individ-
ual steps can be analyzed in isolation. There are extensive literatures that
identify weaknesses in the ways in which adults perform these steps (see,
e.g., Camerer 1995; and Fischhoﬀ 1988).
There is a smaller literature that attempts to analyze the decision-
making performance of adolescents and how adolescents diﬀer from
adults. The general themes in this literature seem to be that there is little
evidence, particularly evidence that makes direct comparisons between ad-
olescents and adults, that much of the evidence is, as assessed by research-
ers whose analysis most resembles the perspective of economists, weak
owing to methodological problems, and that, while what little evidence
there is suggests a few diﬀerences between adolescents and adults, on the
whole they are remarkably similar. Indeed, a review article by Furby and
Beyth-Marom (1992) emphasizes that many common conceptions of how
youths diﬀer from adults do not seem to be borne out by the evidence.4
Many studies ask subjects to formulate lists of potential consequences
of various behaviors. Beyth-Marom et al. (1993) is one of the few studies
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4. For reviews in this vein, see also Fischhoﬀ (1992) and Beyth-Marom and Fischhoﬀ
(1997).of this type that directly compares adolescents and adults. Teens and par-
e n t sw e r ea s k e dt og e n e r a t ep o s s i b l ec o n s e q u e n c e so fs e v e r a ld e c i s i o n s
(e.g., you were [your child was] at a party where marijuana was passed
around and decided to smoke). Although there were a few diﬀerences—
for instance, on average, adults generated slightly more consequences, and
adolescents were slightly more likely to mention consequences involving
social reactions—overall the most striking conclusion was the similarity
between adults and adolescents.
Some list-the-consequences studies focus on the question of how future-
oriented youths are. Lewis (1981) conducted a study that compares adoles-
cents in three grade categories (grades 7–8, 10, and 12). In simulated peer-
counseling sessions, subjects were presented hypothetical dilemmas and
asked what advice they would give to a peer who faced these dilemmas.
One of the main results was a signiﬁcant increase with grade level in the
mention of the potential risks and future consequences of decisions, which
supports the hypothesis that there is an increase in future orientation
through adolescence.5 Further evidence of this hypothesis is reviewed in
Greene (1986), who concludes that “adolescents, as compared to younger
children: (1) demonstrate greater depth and extension of temporal per-
s p e c t i v e...;( 2 )p r o j e c tam o r ec o m p l e x ,d i ﬀerentiated set of future expec-
t a t i o n s...;a n d( 3 )d e s c r i b ef uture aspirations with greater planfulness,
organization, and realism” (p. 100).6
Comparisons have been conducted between adolescents and adults not
only in awareness of consequences but also in perceptions of the likelihood
of those consequences. Quadrel, Fischhoﬀ, and Davis (1993) test the con-
ventional wisdom that youths are prone to feelings of invulnerability by
asking subjects to assess the likelihood that various negative events would
occur to themselves, an acquaintance, a close friend, and their parent or
child. Subjects typically assessed similar likelihoods for themselves and
for others. There was some evidence for feelings of invulnerability—con-
ditional on assessing diﬀerent likelihoods, subjects were twice as likely to
assess lower likelihoods for themselves—but this invulnerability was not
stronger for adolescents than for adults.7
In fact, there is evidence that youths are in some ways overly pessimistic
about their future. Fischhoﬀ et al. (2000) survey youths about personal
probabilities of dying young. For a representative sample of ﬁfteen- and
sixteen-year-olds, the mean response to how likely it is that they would die
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5. A contrary result, however, was that there seemed to be no diﬀerence across grade levels
in recommendations as to whether peers or parents should be consulted for advice.
6. Greene conducts an experiment to determine whether such changes are correlated with
the emergence of Piaget’s formal-operations reasoning and ﬁnds at best very weak evidence.
7. In fact, the invulnerability was stronger among adults than among adolescents, but this
seemed merely to reﬂect the plausible consensus among youths and adults that the adults
were less vulnerable to many of the risks under consideration.in the next year was 18.6 percent, whereas the statistical estimate is 0.08
percent. The mean response to how likely it is that they would die by age
twenty was 20.3 percent, whereas the statistical estimate is 0.4 percent.
Researchers have also asked whether adolescents are competent deci-
sion makers. For instance, Weithorn and Campbell (1982) presented ado-
lescents with hypothetical medical- and psychological-treatment deci-
sions, ﬁnding that fourteen-year-olds scored as well as eighteen- and
twenty-one-year-olds in competency, and Lewis (1987) concludes that, in
terms of pregnancy and contraceptive decisions, adolescents may equal
adults in their competence to reason.
While the studies discussed above examine hypothetical decisions, an-
other literature examines how adolescents’ perceptions of consequences,
the likelihood of consequences, and the importance of consequences pre-
dict their own behavior. For instance, Bauman (1980) presented seventh
graders with ﬁfty-four potential consequences that might occur if they
used marijuana and asked them to rate on a ﬁve-point scale both the likeli-
hood and the importance of those consequences to themselves. These rat-
ings were then found to be predictive of self-reported marijuana use by the
same individuals one year later. A similar technique has been used by a
variety of researchers to study cigarette smoking, drinking, and sexual in-
tercourse. Furby and Beyth-Marom (1992) summarize (and criticize) these
studies and conclude that, “in sum, what little evidence there is (with all
its mentioned weaknesses) suggests that to at least some small extent teens
choose to engage in behaviors which are more likely to bring consequences
they perceive as positive and less likely to bring consequences they per-
ceive as negative” (pp. 16–17).
Many of the studies in this volume also support this conclusion. For
instance, Gruber and Zinman (chap. 2) ﬁnd that youth smoking depends
negatively on price, at least for older teens; Pacula et al. (chap. 6) ﬁnd that
youth marijuana use depends negatively on both price and the perceived
risk of future harm; and Levine (chap. 4) ﬁnds that teenage women are less
likely to have sex and more likely to use contraceptives when labor market
conditions are good and when the perceived risk of HIV infection is high.
These ﬁndings that adolescents react to costs and beneﬁts suggest that
youths are to some degree rational in pursuing their well-being. But, since
all behavioral-economics models with which we are familiar assume that
people respond to costs and beneﬁts, such ﬁndings say nothing about the
validity of the extreme rational-choice model.
The evidence reviewed above suggests that adolescents are similar to
adults in terms of their ability to carry out the decision-making process.
Youths seem to diﬀer more from adults in how they value the conse-
quences of decisions. In fact, research in developmental psychology that
studies adolescent behavior focuses not on the decision-making process,
but rather on what considerations matter most to adolescents. Much of
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formation, sexual-identity formation, and establishing autonomy and in-
dependence. This research suggests that adolescents may make decisions
based primarily on these considerations, not on “objective” consequences.
For instance, an adolescent male may drive fast so as to conﬁrm his mas-
culine identity, virtually ignoring the potential negative consequences.
Baumrind (1987) even argues that many risk-taking behaviors by adoles-
cents play an integral role in identity formation and making the transition
to adulthood.8
There are, of course, other reasons why youths and adults might value
consequences diﬀerently. Over the years, many studies have found that
youths tend to score higher than adults on sensation-seeking and risk-
taking behavior (e.g., Zuckerman, Eysenck, and Eysenck 1978; and Arnett
1994). And, presumably, youths are more concerned than adults are with
how their peers will react to their behavior.
Diﬀerences in how youths and adults value consequences reﬂect diﬀer-
ences in preferences, which in our model means diﬀerences in the instan-
taneous utility functions. If a young male engages in some risky behavior
because it satisﬁes a need to conﬁrm his masculine identity, or because it
yields desirable sensations, or because it will provoke positive reactions
from his peers, it seems natural to conclude that he has positive marginal
instantaneous utility from engaging in the behavior.
The theoretical analysis developed below does not focus per se on how
adolescent preferences diﬀer from adult preferences. Instead, we focus on
the ways in which youths fail to behave in their own best interests and for
the most part remain agnostic about what those best interests are. But the
fact that youths care a lot about such things as identity formation, sensa-
tion seeking, and peer reactions that tend to increase short-term beneﬁts
in a highly variable way may imply that the errors that we discuss are
particularly problematic for youths, even if youths and adults do not diﬀer
in their inherent propensity for these errors.
The evidence on risk perceptions and diﬀerential preferences discussed
above suggests some ways in which our analysis in section 1.3 of incor-
rectly predicting preferences and in section 1.4 of repeated risky choices
may be especially applicable to youths. While the evidence discussed
above comparing the future orientation of adolescents and that of adults
is relevant to our analysis of self-control problems in section 1.2, we dis-
cuss more direct evidence on the relation between age and self-control
problems when we discuss evidence on self-control problems more gen-
erally.
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8. For recent research by economists that explores the role of identity, see Akerlof and
Kranton (2000).1.2 Trading Oﬀ Present versus Future Consequences
Most of the risky behaviors addressed in this volume involve a trade-oﬀ
between short-term beneﬁts and long-term costs. The decision whether to
have sex involves a trade-oﬀ between the short-term beneﬁt of sexual plea-
sure and the long-term cost of possibly getting pregnant or acquiring a
sexually transmitted disease. The decision whether to commit a crime in-
volves a trade-oﬀ between the short-term thrill or material beneﬁts of the
crime and the long-term costs of possibly going to jail. The decision
whether to drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, or use other drugs involves a
trade-oﬀ between the short-term beneﬁts of consumption and the long-
term costs to future health, job prospects, and personal satisfaction. Each
of these domains is quite rich, and, clearly, no single factor can explain the
misbehavior of youths in these domains. But there is a simple error that
plays a signiﬁcant role across all these domains: excessive myopia in trad-
ing oﬀ present versus future consequences.
In order to discuss errors in trading oﬀ present versus future conse-
quences, we must begin with a normative standard of how a person should
trade oﬀ present versus future consequences to maximize her true well-
being, which requires a discussion of the appropriateness of discounting.
Economists use the notion discounting in a variety of ways.9 Most common
and most literal is to assume that discounting is part of a person’s pref-
erences. However, given the fundamental disposition toward revealed-
preference theory and the assumption that whatever informed people do
must be optimal for them, economists often take the view that, if such dis-
counting is merely a matter of preference, then it is not to be questioned.
We take a diﬀerent view, one that we think is more in accord with the
intuition that everybody—including most economists when we let our
methodological guard down—views as a more sensible welfare criterion:
that we should wish on ourselves, our children, our neighbors, and society
the equal weighting of the expected hedonic well-being at diﬀerent mo-
ments.
Most of us would ﬁnd it morally repugnant if, controlling for uncertain-
ties, personality, physical diﬀerences, etc., a parent admitted openly that
he cares about the well-being of his ﬁve-year-old son ten times more
than he cares about the well-being of his ten-year-old daughter. We would
similarly be repulsed if he admitted that, again controlling for uncertain-
ties, he cares ten times more about his ﬁve-year-old’s current well-being
than he cares about the same child’s well-being ﬁve years from now, when
he becomes a ten-year-old. For a parent to apply such diﬀerential weights
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9. We ignore the “ﬁnancial discounting” of money owing to interest earned, which has
nothing to do with issues of hedonic discounting of the sort that we consider here.to the hedonic well-being of his diﬀerent children or to the hedonic well-
being of one of his children at diﬀerent ages is morally insane.
We believe that people should be just as repulsed if a ﬁfteen-year-old
says that he cares ten times more about his own current well-being than
he cares about his own well-being ﬁve years from now, when he becomes
a twenty-year-old. That is, we ought to be willing to make the same sort
of normative judgments that we make about how a parent weights the
hedonic well-being of his children about how an individual weights his
hedonic well-being at diﬀerent times in his life. Just as we must at times
make reasoned judgments about whether a particular thirty-ﬁve-year-old
is a ﬁt guardian for a particular ﬁfteen-year-old, so, too, we must at times
make reasoned judgments about whether the ﬁfteen-year-old is a ﬁt guard-
ian for her thirty-ﬁve-year-old self.
This argument for no hedonic discounting provides the basis for not
including a discount function in our base model. But, as most economists
(implicitly or explicitly) recognize, a discount function often serves as a
useful reduced form to capture unmodeled uncertainties such as the prob-
ability of death or severe illness. As a simple illustration, suppose that the
only uncertainty that matters is whether a person is alive or dead and that
the person’s utility is a function of consumption if living and a constant if
dead. If the probability of dying between periods  and 1i sq, then,
from the perspective of period t, the probability of being alive in period 
is (1  q)t—that is, p(alive)  (1  q)t. Normalizing u(,d e a d ) 0,
we can then usefully conceptualize the person’s true well-being as being
given by Wt  T
ttu(, alive), where   1  q.
In a variety of settings, therefore, a discount factor ought to be incorpo-
rated into the model as a sort of heuristic used by the people we are model-
ing, or as a heuristic being used by the modelers, to capture unmodeled
contingencies. People should discount the future in the same sense that
they discount a rumor of a coming appearance by (say) Johnny Depp—
because they doubt whether it will happen. Our claim is that, from a norm-
ative perspective, such “heuristic discounting” is the only proper source
of discounting.
Of course, when one looks at the choices that people make, substantial
discounting beyond plausible uncertainties seems to be a fundamental be-
havioral reality—that is, people are excessively myopic relative to what
would maximize their true well-being.10 To model excessive myopia, we
begin with the simple exponential-discounting formulation that is com-
monly used by economists. Suppose that a person makes choices that
aﬀect her well-being in periods 1, 2,...,T,a n dl e tu denote her instanta-
38 Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin
10. For an overview of how to go about separating assessment of hedonic return to activi-
ties from revealed-preference theory, see Kahneman, Diener, and Schwartz (1999).neous utility in period . Suppose further that the person’s true overall
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In this formulation,  ˆ is the person’s heuristic discount factor, capturing
unmodeled uncertainties as discussed above.
As a simple form of inappropriate discounting, we suppose that, in pe-












where  is the discount factor that she uses when making decisions. Simple
excessive myopia says that the discount factor that the person uses when
making decisions is smaller than her true heuristic discount factor—that
is, 	 ˆ. As a result, at each moment, the person gives too little weight to
her future well-being.
Because the risky behaviors studied in this volume tend to generate pos-
itive short-term beneﬁts and negative long-term consequences, simple
excessive myopia makes people overly likely to engage in risky behaviors
relative to the normative standard. Suppose, for instance, that a young
person must decide whether to engage in sexual intercourse. In making
this decision, she takes into account both the sexual pleasure that she
would derive from the act and the expected costs that she might bear later
in life. Formally, suppose that there are two periods, youth and adulthood,
and that engaging in sexual intercourse in period 1 yields immediate plea-
sure u1  10 but causes an expected future cost of 15, so u2  15. Absti-
nence yields u1  u2  0. If the person’s true heuristic discount factor is
 ˆ  1, the youth should choose abstinence, but if to make decisions the
youth uses any discount factor 
2/3, she would choose sex.
It is instructive to explore calibrationwise what magnitudes of dis-
counting are consistent with heuristic discounting of the sort that we dis-
cuss above. Suppose, for instance, that a ﬁfteen-year-old has a 50 percent
chance of being alive and well at age thirty-ﬁve (which is obviously conser-
vative). Then, under the simple formulation with Wt  T
t ˆtu, the per-
son’s yearly  ˆ should be something on the order of 0.966 (i.e., 0.96620 
0.5). Hence, even yearly discount factors of 0.95 should perhaps be consid-
ered excessive myopia.
The discussion presented above suggests that youths might engage in
too much risky behavior because they attach too little weight to their well-
being as adults. A related question arises: In terms of the discount factor
that they use in making decisions, are youths more impatient than adults?
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higher rate than do adults and that this diﬀerence might explain certain
diﬀerences in behavior between youths and adults (e.g., Becker and Mur-
phy 1988).11 We think that there is truth to this but that there are some
subtleties involved of which researchers are not fully aware. In particular,
people seem to have in mind using the exponential-discounting formula-
tion combined with an assumption that  gets larger as a person gets
older—for example, a sixteen-year-old has preferences T
16 (0.8)16u,
whereas a thirty-year-old has preferences T
30 (0.9)30u. But this formal-
ization would imply that preferences are time inconsistent, and, moreover,
the form of the time inconsistency seems intuitively wrong: it would imply,
for instance, that people systematically plan to be indulgent in their distant
future and then change their minds when the moment arrives. As we dis-
cuss below, people tend to exhibit exactly the opposite behavior.12
Realistically, youths are more impatient than adults. But it is probably
best to model such diﬀerences by assuming date-speciﬁc per period dis-
count factors. That is, for each k, there exists a discount factor k between
periods k and k  1, and in period t the person chooses her behavior, to



















Unfortunately, this formulation is not very easy to work with. Both empiri-
cal research and theoretical research become more diﬃcult when there are
multiple discount parameters to consider.
While the formulation presented above assumes time-consistent dis-
counting,evidenceisclearthatpeopletendtohaveatime-inconsistentpref-
erence for immediate gratiﬁcation. That is, when people make decisions
that have both short-run and long-run consequences, they tend to satisfy
their immediate wants in ways that they do not like from a long-run per-
spective.13 Such preferences imply that people have self-control problems
wherein they are unable on a moment-by-moment basis to behave in their
own long-run best interests.
While the phenomenon is more general, there is a particularly simple
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11. An alternative explanation is that youths “look” more impatient than adults because
their perceived instantaneous utilities diﬀer. We discuss this possibility in sec. 1.3 below.
12. Another subtlety goes hand in hand with the time inconsistency: Is the person aware
of how her preferences will change? We discuss this issue below in the context of a preference
for immediate gratiﬁcation.
13. See, e.g., Ainslie (1975, 1991, 1992), Ainslie and Haslam (1992a, 1992b), Loewenstein
and Prelec (1992), Thaler (1991), and Thaler and Loewenstein (1992). While the rubric
hyperbolic discounting is often used to describe such preferences, the qualitative feature of
the time inconsistency is more general (and more generally supported by empirical evidence)















where 	1. This formulation is a simple modiﬁcation of the standard
model of exponential discounting, where the parameter  represents the
time-inconsistent preference for immediate gratiﬁcation—at any given
moment, the person has an extra bias for the present over the future.
The assumption that people have a preference for immediate gratiﬁca-
tion accords with introspection, folk wisdom, and the psychological evi-
dence. The most prevalent form of psychological evidence is evidence of
declining discount rates. As an illustration, consider the ﬁndings in Green,
Fry, and Myerson (1994). As part of their study (we shall return to other
parts), twelve undergraduates at Washington University in St. Louis (aver-
aging twenty years of age) were asked to make a series of choices between
a delayed reward of $1,000 and an immediate reward ranging between $1
and $1,000. The length of the delay and the amount of the immediate
reward were varied.15 From this procedure, and from the relatively consis-
tent behavior observed, discount functions can be inferred by comparing
the “immediate equivalent” of $1,000 delayed by diﬀerent durations.
Green, Fry, and Myerson do not report the raw data but visually present
the median immediate equivalents. By our own visual inspection of this
picture (their ﬁg. 1), the immediate equivalent of $1,000 in one year was
$625, the immediate equivalent of $1,000 in ﬁve years was $350, and the
immediate equivalent of $1,000 in twenty-ﬁve years was $100. These num-
bers correspond to discount rates of 60 percent per year for year 1, but
only 16 percent per year for years 2–5, and only 6 percent per year for
years 6–25.16 While the speciﬁc discount rates are not closely matched with
other discount rates reported in the same study—for example, discounting
was less severe for a $10,000 delayed reward—or in other studies, the gen-
eral feature of declining discount rates is universal.17
14. These preferences were originally developed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in the context
of intergenerational altruism and later used by Laibson (1994) to model time inconsistency
within an individual. This model has since been used by Laibson (1996, 1997), Laibson,
Repetto, and Tobacman (1998), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, in
press), Fischer (1997), and others.
15. Delays of one week, one month, six months, one year, three years, ﬁve years, ten years,
and twenty-ﬁve years were used. Thirty diﬀerent values between $1 and $1,000 were used for
the immediate rewards.
16. For example, $625(1.6)  $1,000, and $350(1.6)(1.16)4  $1,000.
17. Extreme caution should be used in making too much of these results. In addition to
having a small sample size, this study infers discount functions from trade-oﬀs involving
money amounts, which should not logically serve as proxies for utility discounting. Even so,
there have been dozens of studies over the years that ﬁnd that variants of hyperbolic dis-
counting ﬁt human and nonhuman choice better than exponential discounting (for additional
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might want to engage in some indulgent behavior at the present moment
while at the same time they would prefer not to engage in the same indul-
gent behavior in the future. Hence, when people think about having sex,
drinking alcohol, taking drugs, and so forth, their desire to do the activity
now is greater than their current desire to do it in the future. This, in turn,
implies that a person is more likely to engage in an indulgent activity at the
moment of action than she would have preferred at some prior moment.
To illustrate, consider a modiﬁcation of our earlier sex example. Sup-
pose that having sex yields immediate beneﬁts of 10 but has expected long-
term costs of 15, and suppose that a person has the (, ) preferences
described above with 1/2 and 1. Consider how a person feels in
period t about having sex now, in period t, versus having sex in the future,
in some period tt. Because having sex now yields utility 10  (1/2)15
 0, the person would like to have sex now; and, because having sex in
the future yields utility (1/2)10  (1/2)15 	 0, the person in period t would
prefer not to have sex in period t. But, when period t arrives, the person
will then view having sex as yielding utility 10  (1/2)15  0 and will
therefore then prefer to have sex.
The implications of having a preference for immediate gratiﬁcation of-
ten depend on the person’s beliefs about her own future behavior. Most
research has focused on two extreme assumptions about beliefs. Sophisti-
cated people are fully aware of their future self-control problems and there-
fore correctly predict how their future selves will behave, and naive people
are fully unaware of their future self-control problems and therefore be-
lieve that their future selves will behave exactly as they currently would
like them to behave.18 But, clearly, this is a continuum; O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999d, in press) model a person who is partially naive—she is aware
that she has future self-control problems, but she underestimates their
magnitude.
A simple way in which to formalize these diﬀerent beliefs is to suppose
that a person is characterized not only by her true preference for immedi-
a t eg r a t i ﬁ c a t i o n ,a sr e ﬂ e c t e db y, but also by her beliefs as to what her
future preference for immediate gratiﬁcation will be, which we denote by
 ˆ. A sophisticated person, who knows exactly her future preference for
immediate gratiﬁcation, has perceptions  ˆ  . A naive person, who be-
lieves that she will not have a preference for immediate gratiﬁcation in the
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examples with human subjects, see Solnick et al. [1980], Myerson and Green [1995], and
Kirby and Marakovic [1995]). To the best of our knowledge, there have been no studies in
which behavior was found that ﬁts exponential discounting better than hyperbolic dis-
counting.
18. Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968) carefully lay out these two assumptions (and develop
the labels) but do not much consider the implications of assuming one versus the other.
Fischer (1997) and Laibson (1994, 1996, 1997) assume sophisticated beliefs. O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999c) consider both and explicitly contrast the two.future, has perceptions  ˆ  1. A partially naive person has perceptions
 ˆ but  ˆ 	 1.
To illustrate the importance of beliefs, consider yet another version of
our sex example. We again suppose that having sex yields immediate bene-
ﬁts of 10 but long-term costs of 15 and that a person has (, ) preferences
with 1/2and1. But, instead of analyzing a person who is deciding
whether to have sex now, we analyze a person who is planning to go on a
date tonight (which we think of as the next period), during which she might
have sex. Our discussion above implies that the person would prefer not
to have sex tonight, and, hence, if she predicts that she would have sex,
she may make some “commitment” so as to prevent herself from having
sex—for example, she might cancel the date, ask a friend or parent to
come along as a chaperone, etc. What is her prediction? Given beliefs  ˆ,
the person believes that this evening she will feel that having sex yields
utility 10  ˆ(15), and, thus, she predicts that she will have sex this evening
if  ˆ 	 2/3. We can conclude that if  ˆ 	 2/3, she would avoid having
unwanted sex, whereas if  ˆ  2/3, she would not make a commitment and
end up having unwanted sex.
Beliefs about one’s future preference for immediate gratiﬁcation need
not inﬂuence behavior. There is a class of situations in which beliefs do
not aﬀect behavior, namely, when decisions are disconnected in the sense
that both the short-term and the long-term consequences of any speciﬁc
decision are unrelated to those of any other decision. But, when one deci-
sion constitutes a commitment that changes later choice sets, or when the
beneﬁts or costs of decisions in diﬀerent periods are tied together in some
way, beliefs typically matter. This is likely the case for many of the behav-
iors examined in this volume. For instance, there may be decreasing re-
turns to the number of times a person has sex in a week, or the expected
future costs of having sex may be nonlinear in the number of times a per-
son has sex. The very essence of addictive behaviors such as smoking ciga-
rettes, drinking alcohol, and taking other drugs is that the utility from
both consumption and nonconsumption depends on how much a person
has consumed in the past.
To further illustrate the implications of sophistication versus naı ¨vete ´,w e
return once again to our sex example. Suppose that a person has multiple
opportunities to have sex and that the expected future cost of having sex
is a nonlinear function of the number of sexual encounters. For any indi-
vidual encounter, the perceived future cost of having sex on this particular
occasion depends on both how often the person has had sex in the past
and how often she expects to have sex in the future. Suppose, for simplic-
ity, that the person has two opportunities to have sex, in periods 1 and 2,
and then possibly experiences some cost in period 3. The beneﬁts from
having sex in periods 1 and 2 are V1 and V2, respectively. Let Cn be the
expected period 3 cost if the person has sex n times, in which case the
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1a n dV2 	 min{C1, C2  C1}, which implies that, from a long-run
perspective, the person should not have sex in period 2.
Consider the period 1 decision when V2  max{C1, (C2  C1)}, which
implies that in period 2 the person will have sex regardless of what she did
in period 1. A sophisticated person in period 1 recognizes that she will
have sex in period 2 and therefore views her decision in period 1 as having
sex twice versus having sex once. Hence, she chooses to have sex in period
1i fV1  (C2  C1). In contrast, a naive person in period 1 believes that
she will not have sex in period 2 and therefore views her decision in period
1 as having sex once versus not having sex at all. Hence, she chooses to
have sex in period 1 if V1  C1. Whether a naive person is more or less
likely than a sophisticated person to indulge in period 1 depends on
whether the costs are convex or concave. With convex costs, pessimism
about the future makes a sophisticated person perceive the cost of current
indulgence to be larger than does a naive person, and, hence, a sophisti-
cated person is less likely to indulge. With concave costs, pessimism about
the future makes a sophisticated person perceive the cost of current indul-
gence to be smaller than does a naive person, and, hence, a sophisticated
person is more likely to indulge.
In fact, more matters than just the eﬀects of pessimism. Let us recon-
sider this example when C1  V2  (C2  C1), which implies that in
period 2 the person will have sex only if she had sex in period 1. The mind-
set of a naive person is the same as before: she expects not to have sex in
period 2 no matter what she does now and therefore chooses to have sex
in period 1 if V1  C1. A sophisticated person, in contrast, recognizes in
period 1 that her decision is eﬀectively between having sex twice versus
not having sex at all and therefore chooses to have sex in period 1 if V1 
[C1  (C2  C1)  V2]. Inspection reveals that, for this case, a naive
person is unambiguously more likely to choose to have sex in period 1.
The two cases in this example illustrate two eﬀects of sophistication.
On one hand, there is a pessimism eﬀect: a sophisticated person is more
pessimistic than a naive person about her future behavior, and this pessi-
mism may aﬀect the perceived future consequences of current indulgence.
As the example illustrates, this eﬀect can go in either direction. Second,
there is an incentive eﬀect: a sophisticated person might recognize that to
avoid future indulgence, she must restrain herself now.19
Although, in theory, sophistication about future self-control problems
can mitigate or exacerbate misbehavior, we suspect that for realistic envi-
ronments, sophistication more often than not mitigates the harm caused
19. These two eﬀects are ﬁrst identiﬁed (and named) in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,
1999b) for the realm of addiction. Those papers show that, for addictive goods, the pessi-
mism eﬀect leads a sophisticated person to indulge more than a naive person while the incen-
tive eﬀect leads a sophisticated person to indulge less.
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impressionistic, but it is based on a conjecture that, in real-world environ-
ments, the incentive eﬀect is likely quite important. Naive people are hurt
not just because optimism about the future leads them to perceive small
costs of current misbehavior, but also because they fail at self-manage-
ment—they do things in the present that lead them to do more indulgent
things in the future.
In what ways might self-control problems be particularly relevant for
youths? There are two immediate points of comparison between youths
and adults. First, do youths have a larger preference for immediate gratiﬁ-
cation than do adults—that is, do youths have a smaller ? Second, are
youths less good at predicting their future preference for immediate grati-
ﬁcation—that is, do youths have a larger  ˆ? While the answers to these
questions are both intuitively yes, there is limited evidence. We know of
no experimental evidence on how adolescents compare to other age groups
in terms of awareness of self-control problems, but the Green, Fry, and
Myerson (1994) study cited above provides some suggestive evidence in
terms of the magnitude of the preference for immediate gratiﬁcation. In
addition to gathering evidence on twenty-year-old college students, Green,
Fry, and Myerson also report data on sixth graders (averaging twelve years
old) from private religious schools and elderly subjects (averaging sixty-
eight years old) from a subject pool maintained by the Washington Univer-
sity Psychology Department for the study of aging. Using the same meth-
ods that we used above to derive the discount rates for college students of
60, 16, and 6 percent per year for horizons of one year, one to ﬁve years,
and ﬁve to twenty-ﬁve years, the comparable numbers are 111, 21, and 2
percent for sixth graders and 14, 8, and 8 percent for elderly subjects. We
are highly skeptical of the external validity of the precise estimates, but
they suggest that near-term discounting becomes less severe through ado-
lescence (comparing the twenty-year-olds and the twelve-year-olds) and
even less severe through adulthood.20
Of course, even if youths were no diﬀerent from adults in terms of both
their preference for immediate gratiﬁcation and their awareness, the impli-
cations of these errors could still be quite diﬀerent in youths and in adults.
A preference for immediate gratiﬁcation is relevant only to the extent that
the person faces temptations, and youths and adults may diﬀer on this
dimension in a number of ways. First, there may be diﬀerences in inherent
preferences—in the types of activities that youths and adults actually en-
joy. Second, even for activities that yield equal intrinsic beneﬁts for youths
and adults, youths may perceive even larger immediate beneﬁts from en-
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20. Again, extreme caution should be used in making too much of these results. In addition
to our earlier reservations, here the money amounts likely mean diﬀerent things to the diﬀer-
ent age groups.gaging in the activity owing to secondary considerations unique to adoles-
cents, such as peer pressure, identity formation, or establishing autonomy.
As a result, such activities become even more tempting for youths. Third,
youths and adults face diﬀerent opportunity sets that aﬀect the types of
tempting situations with which they are faced. Given the professional and
personal constraints that adults face, many activities that might be tempt-
ing are so costly as not to pose a problem. Youths may be tempted to use
illicit drugs, for instance, when the costs are too high for adults.
1.3 Mispredicting Future Utility
Section 1.2 above discusses errors in intertemporal trade-oﬀso w i n gt o
excessive discounting. This section discusses a second way in which people
make errors in weighing intertemporal trade-oﬀs: they misperceive how
they will feel about the future consequences of their actions.
The source of such errors is changing preferences, changes due to such
factors as past behavior, temporary ﬂuctuations in tastes, and changes in
the environment. The notion that “states”—factors other than contempo-
raneous consumption—can aﬀect preferences is not new to economics.
For instance, many models over the years posit that people become accus-
tomed to past consumption levels (see, e.g., Duesenberry 1952; Ryder and
Heal 1973; and Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin 1999), Becker and Murphy
(1988) build a model of addiction based on earlier research on habit for-
mation (e.g., Pollak 1970, 1978) wherein the utility from consuming an
addictive product depends on past consumption, and Laibson (in press)
studies how changes in exogenous states, which he calls cues, can aﬀect
well-being.
Most models of state-dependent utility assume that a person can per-
fectly predict how changes in future states will aﬀect her future prefer-
ences. For example, if a person must make summer vacation plans during
the winter, it is assumed that she can predict how she will feel in the sum-
mer; and, if a person must decide whether to try crack cocaine for the ﬁrst
time, it is assumed that she can correctly predict how this consumption
will inﬂuence her future enjoyment of activities, including consuming more
crack cocaine. In a recent paper, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin
(1999) formalize and explore the implications of a general bias in such
predictions, which they label projection bias: people tend to underappreci-
ate the eﬀects of changes in their states and hence falsely project their
current consumption preferences onto their future preferences. In this sec-
tion, we review the evidence in support of such projection bias, present a
simpliﬁed version of their model, and discuss its implications both in gen-
eral and for youths in particular.
Research shows that people underappreciate short-term, transient
changes in preferences, such as those induced by ﬂuctuations in hunger or
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lasting changes, such as those induced by addiction or changes in one’s
accustomed standard of living. Moreover, people underappreciate endoge-
nous changes in preferences that depend on prior choices, such as drug
addiction, and exogenous changes in preferences that do not depend on
prior choices, such as those associated with aging. We discuss here a few
representative studies.21
The prototypical example of incorrectly predicting short-term ﬂuctua-
tions in tastes is underappreciating the eﬀects of hunger. Read and van
Leeuwen (1998), for instance, asked oﬃce workers to choose between
healthy snacks and unhealthy snacks that they would receive in one week,
at a time when they should expect to be either hungry (late in the after-
noon) or satiated (immediately after lunch). Subjects were approached to
make the choice either when they were hungry (late in the afternoon) or
when they were satiated (immediately after lunch). In general, people who
expected to be hungry the next week were more likely to opt for unhealthy
snacks than were those who expected to be satiated. But the key ﬁnding
was that people who were hungry when they made the choice were also
more likely to opt for unhealthy snacks than were those who were satiated,
suggesting that people were projecting their current preferences onto their
future selves.
Loewenstein, Nagin, and Paternoster (1997) provide evidence of pro-
jection bias with regard to sexual arousal. Male undergraduates were ran-
domly assigned to view sexually arousing or nonarousing photographs.
Subjects were then exposed to a vivid ﬁrst-person date scenario in which
“their date” suddenly requested a termination of physical intimacy, and
asked to report their likelihood of behaving in a sexually aggressive fash-
ion in this situation. Aroused subjects reported substantially higher likeli-
hoods (70 percent) than did nonaroused subjects (50 percent), suggesting
again that people’s current preferences aﬀect their predictions of future
preferences.
The prototypical example of projection bias in predicting long-term
changes in tastes is the underappreciation of adaptation. There is a pleth-
ora of evidence that adaptation is a central component of human well-
being (see Helson [1964]; and for a recent review, see Frederick and Loe-
wenstein [1999]). This literature consistently shows that people adapt to
major changes in life circumstances. But there is also a great deal of evi-
dence that people underestimate the extent to which they will adapt to
new circumstances and hence overestimate the eﬀect of major changes in
circumstances on their long-run level of happiness. For instance, Loe-
wenstein and Frederick (1997) compared the predictions by survey respon-
21. For a more extensive review of the evidence, see Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and
Rabin (1999).
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ing),social (e.g., increases in coﬀee shops), and personal (e.g., increases in
body weight or income) factors would aﬀect their well-being over the next
decade to the reports of others about how actual changes in the last decade
had aﬀected their well-being. A clear pattern of underprediction of adap-
tation emerged in the data: people expected future changes to aﬀect their
well-being much more than others believed that matched changes in the
past had aﬀected their well-being.
To model such incorrect predictions, suppose that a person’s true instan-
taneous utility in period t is given by u(ct, st). The vector ct is the person’s
period t consumption vector, which includes all period t behavior relevant
for current or future instantaneous utilities. The vector st is the person’s
“state” in period t. An individual state could be determined by past con-
sumption (e.g., a person’s addiction level) or by exogenous factors that
might be internal (e.g., depression) or environmental (e.g., peer pressure).
In addition, calendar time could be a state variable; we suspect that projec-
tion bias over states associated with aging may be quite important for
youths.
Letu ˜(c,s|st)denotethepredictionofapersoncurrentlyinstatestofwhat
her instantaneous utility would be from consuming c in state s in period
t. If a person were fully rational, her prediction would be correct—that
is, u ˜(c, s|st)  u(c, s). But the evidence presented above suggests that
people tend to exhibit projection bias, which, roughly speaking, means
that predicted utility u ˜(c, s|st) lies “in between” true utility u(c, s)a n d
utility in the current state u(c, st). For the purposes of the discussion here,
we shall consider a particularly simple formulation of projection bias:22
Definition. Predicted utility exhibits simple projection bias if there ex-
ists   [0, 1] such that, for all c, s, and st, u ˜(c, s|st)  (1  )u(c, s) 
u(c, st).
If 0, the person predicts her future instantaneous utility correctly and
therefore has no projection bias. If 0, the person has projection bias,
where the bigger is , the stronger is the bias.
For any period t and initial state st, a fully rational person would choose
a path of consumption (ct, ct1,...,cT) to maximize true intertemporal
utility Ut  T
t t u(c, s), taking into account how the consumption
path aﬀects the evolution of future states. A person with projection bias
attempts to maximize her intertemporal utility: for any period t and initial
state st, a person with projection bias chooses a path of consumption
(ct, ct1,...,cT) to maximize her perceived intertemporal utility U ˜ t 
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22. This simple formulation incorporates two key features. First, the person understands
the qualitative nature of changes in her preferences but underestimates the magnitude of
these changes. Second, the more the person’s future preferences diﬀer from her current pref-
erences, the further her prediction is from her true future utility. For a more general formula-
tion that incorporates these two features, see Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (1999).T
t tu ˜(c, s|st), taking into account how the consumption path aﬀects
the evolution of future states. In other words, she behaves exactly as a fully
rational person would except that she attempts to maximize U ˜ t  Ut.
Projection bias can have important implications in a broad array of envi-
ronments. There are three categories of errors to which projection bias can
lead, which we illustrate with some simple examples along the lines of the
behaviors discussed in this volume.
The ﬁrst category of projection-bias errors involves choosing a subopti-
mal behavior owing simply to incorrect predictions of the future utility
consequences of the behavior. To illustrate this type of error, suppose that
a person is contemplating suicide owing to extreme depression. Suppose
that the person is currently depressed and that the depression is suﬃciently
painful that, if it were to last a long time, it would be optimal for the per-
son to commit suicide. Because projection bias can lead a person to under-
estimate the true utility of happy times, it can lead a depressed person to
conclude incorrectly that suicide is optimal even when it is not.
We formalize this situation with a two-period model in which the person
is “depressed” in period 1 and “happy” in period 2—that is, no matter
what her behavior, the person’s state will be D in period 1 and H in period
2. At the start of period 1, the person decides whether to commit suicide,
where we normalize the utility from committing suicide to be 0. If the
person chooses to live, then she receives utility u(life, D)  2 in period
1 and utility u(life, H)  3 in period 2. Assuming no discounting, the
person’s optimal choice is clearly to live because the eventual happy times
are suﬃciently happy to make it worth enduring the depression. But, with
simple projection bias , at the time she is deciding whether to com-
mit suicide the person perceives her period 2 payoﬀ from life to be u ˜(life,
H | D)  (1  )(3)  (2). If her projection bias is big enough (
3/5), then the person makes the incorrect choice to commit suicide.23
In the example given above, the person’s state in each period is indepen-
dent of her behavior; she chooses suboptimally only because her state at
the time she makes the decision clouds her evaluation of the available op-
tions. Projection bias has more complicated and more damaging eﬀects
when the person’s future state depends on her current behavior. In particu-
lar, if engaging in some activity causes future preferences to change in a
deleterious way, then projection bias leads to overindulgence in that activ-
ity. For instance, if becoming addicted to cigarettes decreases a person’s
overall well-being, a person with projection bias will overindulge in ciga-
rettes.
The ﬁrst category of projection-bias errors is driven by incorrect predic-
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23. A simple extension of this example shows the beneﬁts of cooling-oﬀ periods for poten-
tial suicide victims. If the person delays until the depression at least partially subsides, she
will perceive the utility of happy times to be closer to its true value and therefore will be less
likely to commit suicide when she should not. This theme is discussed further in Loewenstein,
O’Donoghue, and Rabin (1999).tions of the future utility consequences of today’s behavior. Incorrectly
predicting future preferences can also cause a person to incorrectly predict
future behavior, and—just as we saw for a preference for immediate grati-
ﬁcation—incorrect predictions of future behavior can lead to bad deci-
sions today. The second and third categories of projection-bias errors both
revolve around how incorrect predictions of future behavior can lead to
suboptimal decisions now.
The second category of projection-bias errors occurs when incorrect
predictions of future behavior cause incorrect predictions about the future
consequences of current choices. For instance, if projection bias leads a
person to underestimate how often she will have sex in the future, then she
may have an incorrect prediction about the future cost of having sex now.
This logic is similar to that behind the pessimism eﬀect in the realm of
self-control problems and, just as for the pessimism eﬀect,canleadtomore
or less current indulgence depending on the speciﬁcs of the environment.
For instance, if a person who is not pregnant incorrectly predicts that, if
she were pregnant, she would not get an abortion, then she would perceive
the potential costs of having sex to be larger than they truly are and hence
might be prone toward having too little sex (of course, this eﬀect might be
oﬀset by other errors which we discuss that lead to having too much sex).
The third category of projection-bias errors involves state mismanage-
ment. Because a person’s future behavior depends on her future state,
avoiding certain behaviors may require avoiding certain states.24 But, since
projection bias can lead a person not to recognize how a certain state
would inﬂuence behavior, the person might end up engaging in unantici-
pated indulgent behavior. This failure to avoid situations in which indul-
gence is irresistible is similar to the lack of the incentive eﬀect in people
who are naive about self-control, and both errors tend to cause overindul-
gence.
To illustrate this type of error, suppose that, in the early evening, a per-
son who is not sexually aroused must decide whether to go to a bar. If she
decides not to go to the bar, then she remains at home and sexually un-
aroused for the entire night. If, instead, she goes to the bar, she meets
someone, becomes sexually aroused, and then chooses whether to have
sex. Suppose that optimal state management involves not going to the bar
because she would choose to have sex if she did go to the bar, whereas,
from an ex ante perspective, she would prefer to stay at home all night
than go out and have sex.
To formalize this situation, consider a model with two periods, early
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24. Although his model assumes exogenous states, Laibson (in press) discusses how in a
more general model it is important to manage cues so as to avoid some undesirable behaviors.
Hereferstothisphenomenonascuemanagement,whichmotivatesourtermstatemanagement.evening and later that night. In period 1, the person decides either to go
to the bar or stay home, and her state is sexually unaroused, which we de-
note by N. If she decides to stay home in period 1, then she remains at
home and sexually unaroused for period 2. If she decides to go to the bar,
in contrast, then her period 2 state is sexually aroused, which we denote
by A, and in this state she must make the decision whether to have sex or
to go home. We assume the instantaneous utilities to be as follows:
In Unaroused State In Aroused State
u(home, N)  0 u(home, A)  2
u(bar, N)  1 u(sex, A)  1.5
u(sex, N)  3
The person is better oﬀ in period 1 if she goes to the bar rather than
staying home. But going to the bar can lead to undesirable period 2 behav-
ior, and, indeed, for this example, going to the bar will lead to having sex.
Optimal behavior is to stay home for the entire night because u(bar, N) 
u(sex, A) 	 u(home, N)  u(home, N). Now suppose that the person has
simple projection bias . First note that, no matter what is , the person
would prefer to stay home for the entire evening if she thought she would
have sex in period 2. But, since she perceives u ˜(sex, A|N)  (1  )(1.5)
 (3) and u ˜(home, A|N)  (1  )(2)  (0), for 1/7 the per-
son perceives that she would choose not to have sex in the event that she
goes to the bar, and, moreover, for 1/2 she would choose to go to
the bar.
Such state mismanagement owing to projection bias can arise in a vari-
ety of other domains. For instance, if having one beer creates an increased
desire for additional beers, then optimal state management may require
avoiding bars altogether, whereas projection bias might lead the person to
go to a bar expecting to have only one beer and end up drinking too many.
Similarly, if being in a smoke-ﬁlled room provokes a strong desire to
smoke, then optimal state management may require avoiding smoke-ﬁlled
rooms, whereas projection bias might undermine this decision.
This third category of projection-bias error includes errors that are not
state mismanagement per se; it might also involve a person failing properly
to prepare for some behavior because she did not expect to engage in that
behavior. To return to the sex example, for instance, if the person goes to
the bar expecting not to have sex, she might not bother to bring a condom.
As a result, even if optimal behavior were to have sex with a condom,
the person might have sex without a condom because she planned not to
have sex.
How might projection bias be particularly relevant for youths? The ﬁrst
question to ask is whether youths are more susceptible to projection bias
than are adults. While the answer is almost certainly yes, we know of no
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aware of projection-bias problems and develop rules to help overcome
them over the course of their lives—for example, the common wisdom
“never shop on an empty stomach.” At the same time, the evidence cited
earlier and in Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (1999) makes it clear
that adults do not fully appreciate changes in their preferences even on
dimensions such as hunger where they have accumulated a great deal of
experience. Hence, much as for self-control problems, our impression is
that the major diﬀerences between adults and adolescents in terms of pro-
jection bias are driven not so much by diﬀerent degrees of the bias, but by
how a given degree of bias operates on the diﬀerent preferences and situa-
tions that confront youths and adults.
As discussed in section 1.1 above, youths diﬀer from adults in their con-
cern for identity formation, establishing autonomy, and maintaining the
regard of peers. The natural way to incorporate such concerns into a deci-
sion-making framework is in the utility function; if a person suddenly feels
pressure from his peers to smoke marijuana, then his perceived marginal
utility of smoking marijuana increases. Similarly, if a young person is driv-
ing and suddenly feels a drive to conﬁrm his masculine identity, then his
perceived marginal utility from driving fast increases.
Because such forces inﬂuence utilities, they are subject to projection
bias. For instance, while youths likely recognize that their friends will in-
ﬂuence their desire to engage in various activities, they likely underesti-
mate the magnitude of these forces when they are not with their friends
and, as a result, end up engaging in unwanted behaviors. State mismanage-
ment becomes an important problem. A young person may go out with
his friends expecting to resist peer pressure but then fail to do so. He may,
for instance, go to a bar expecting to have one beer but then be pressured
by his friends to drink many more. Giving in to peer pressure or drives to
conﬁrm identity and autonomy may also, in turn, aﬀect the management
of other states. For instance, a college student might choose to give in to
peer pressure and drink alcohol every weekend, planning to quit when the
peer pressure subsides, but not realizing how much more she will crave
alcohol after she has become addicted.
Projection bias over the states associated with aging may be quite impor-
tant for youths. To evaluate the long-term consequences of many risky be-
haviors, adolescents must predict how they will feel as adults. But youths
and adults clearly have diﬀerent preferences, and projection bias predicts
that youths will underestimate how much their preferences will change as
they age.
To illustrate the importance of this youth-to-adult projection bias, con-
sider a young man who is debating whether to drop out of school, a deci-
sion that will aﬀect whether he has a good job or a bad job as an adult.
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good job, but as a youth, he does not care at all. If the young man has
projection bias with respect to diﬀerences between his youthful and his
adult preferences, he will underestimate the long-run costs of dropping out
of school and will therefore be too likely to drop out of school. An analo-
gous conclusion would hold for any risky behavior, such as taking drugs,
that might inﬂuence his future job prospects.
This youth-to-adult projection bias is perhaps even more important in
the light of changing constraints. For instance, while youths have signiﬁ-
cant free time, adults must work ﬁve days a week. If youths are aware of
these changing constraints, and if, because of projection bias, they predict
that their utility function will not change very much, then they may predict
that their actual utilities will change a lot. If youths currently think that
working ﬁve days a week would be horrible and project this preference
onto their adult selves, they might think that adulthood is going to be one,
long miserable existence and may therefore care very little about imposing
additional costs on their adult selves.
An implicit theme throughout the discussion presented above is that
youths may exhibit behaviors that appear to be extremely myopic when in
fact they are not. Consider a person who gives in to peer pressure or a
drive to conﬁrm his masculine identity. At ﬁrst glance, we might be in-
clined to interpret this behavior as a sudden increase in myopia—to as-
sume that peer pressure made the person neglect the future. We feel that
this interpretation is incorrect. An alternative, projection-bias interpreta-
tion is that, when the pressure to conform is aroused, projection bias
causes the person to exaggerate the persistence of this pressure. Hence,
while he acts as if he cares only about his current well-being, he thinks
that pursuing his immediate well-being is also what he must do for his
long-run well-being.25
1.4 Repeated Risky Choices
Sections 1.2 and 1.3 above abstract away from the probabilistic nature
of the long-term consequences of risky behavior. We now focus on riski-
ness per se, examining situations in which a person repeatedly chooses
while young whether to engage in some behavior that might cause a future
25. Some actions in pursuit of immediate gratiﬁcation may well be usefully thought of not
in terms of either extreme discounting or projection bias but rather in terms of something
more akin to the “visceral” model of choice discussed in Loewenstein (1996). If, e.g., a
teenage boy makes Meatlovian promises with lifelong consequences in the pursuit of immedi-
ate sexual gratiﬁcation, this is perhaps not to be thought of in terms of either an active belief
that his current state of sexual frustration will last a lifetime or a conscious decision that his
near-term gratiﬁcation is more important to him than an entire lifetime of consequences;
rather, he may simply not be attending to these future consequences at all.
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far has assured the bad outcome. Many risky behaviors match this abstract
description to some degree. Even when a young person is aware that smok-
ing can lead to lung cancer or emphysema, he must repeatedly choose
whether to smoke without knowing how much future harm he has already
caused himself. Or a young person might face decisions whether to have
sex on multiple occasions before knowing whether past sexual experiences
have led to pregnancy or AIDS.
We begin our analysis within the rational-choice framework. While the
rational-choice analysis is of interest in its own right, we also use it as a
template to study the implications of the errors discussed in sections 1.2
and 1.3 above in the context of repeated risky choices, and to study the
role that incorrect perceptions of risk can play in risky behavior.
Suppose that a fully rational person chooses up front the number of
times, n, in which to engage in an activity. Let V(n) be the total pleasure
received from engaging in the activity n times, where V is increasing and
concave. We interpret concavity as a proxy for the fact that enjoyment of
the activity varies over time and the person indulges only at the n most en-
joyable times. But we emphasize that, while concavity is convenient, it is
not necessarily a good assumption here.26
Engaging in the activity carries with it the probabilistic cost of some
bad outcome that might occur in the future. We assume that the bad out-
come either occurs or does not occur, and if it occurs, then the person in-
curs a cost 0. In other words, the risk of harm accumulates, but the
extent of harm does not. This feature is central to our results. While unre-
alistic in its extreme, it captures well the qualitative nature of many of the
risky activities examined in this volume.
Formally, we assume that each time the person engages in the activity,
there is an independent probability p that doing so causes the bad outcome
to occur (had it not already been caused). Hence, if the person engages in
the activity once, then the bad outcome occurs with probability p; if the
person engages in the activity twice, then the bad outcome occurs with
probability p  (1  p)p; and, if the person engages in the activity n times,
then the bad outcome occurs with probability (n; p)  1  (1  p)n.T h e
expected cost of engaging in the activity is therefore
Cnp np p
n (; ) (; ) [ ( )]. ≡≡ − −   11
Assuming for simplicity that there is no discounting, and assuming for
analytic ease that n is a continuous variable, the person chooses n to max-
imize his net payoﬀ V(n)  C(n; p). Let n*(p, ) denote the person’s opti-
26. In particular, convexity might be a better assumption for the consumption of addictive
products; consuming moderate amounts of the product can be a horrible mix that yields
many moments of the pain of withdrawal.
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the bad outcome .
The perceived severity of the bad outcome has a simple and straightfor-
ward eﬀect on the person’s behavior: the more costly is the bad outcome—
the larger is —the less the person will engage in the activity. For instance,
the worse a person perceives pregnancy or acquiring HIV to be, the less
unprotected sex the person will have.
Owing to some interesting features of the cost function C(n; p), however,
the perceived riskiness p has considerably more complicated eﬀects on the
person’s behavior. Because C(n; p)i sc o n c a v ei nn, V(n)  C(n; p)c a nb e
convex, which gives rise to possible “corner solutions.” For some parame-
ter values, it can be that the person wants to engage in either none of the
activity or a lot of the activity, never in between. But the more notable
feature of C(n; p) is that increasing the riskiness p can decrease the mar-
ginal cost of engaging in the activity—that is, can decrease ∂C(n; p)/∂n.
Formally, deﬁne np  ∂2/(∂n∂p), which is the cross-partial of .I ti s
straightforward to derive np  (1  p)n1[1  ln(1  p)] so that np  0
for n  1/[ln(1  p)]  n ˆ(p). Moreover, np  0f o rn 	 n ˆ(p), in which
case increasing p increases the marginal cost of engaging in the activity,
and np 	 0f o rn  n ˆ(p), in which case increasing p decreases the marginal
cost of engaging in the activity. Figure 1.1 illustrates how the total cost
and marginal cost depend on n and p.
As indicated by panel A of ﬁgure 1.1, the larger is the perceived riski-
ness, the higher is the expected total cost for any given n. Hence, there is
one straightforward prediction: if, for a given p, the person would not en-
gage in the activity at all, then, for any larger riskiness, the person also
would not engage in the activity at all. If a teenager is refraining entirely
from unprotected sex or drug use and then comes to believe that the bad
consequences of that activity are even more likely than she had earlier
thought, she clearly will not start engaging in the activity.
But, if, for a given p, the person would engage in at least some of the
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Fig. 1.1 Cost functions for p2  p1
ABactivity, an increase in the riskiness might either decrease or increase her
level of that activity. To illustrate, consider the following special functional
form for the beneﬁts V(n):
Vn
rn n n
rn s n n n n n



















where r  s. This function implies that the marginal utility of engaging in























This contrived functional form is useful because, given the concavity of
costs, the person chooses n  {0, nL, nH}. In other words, the person
chooses either abstinence, low indulgence nL, or high indulgence nH. Be-
cause we are interested in whether an increase in riskiness leads to more
or less indulgence, we consider the case where initially the person chooses
low indulgence, or n*(p, )  nL.
If nH 	 n ˆ(p), then an increase in riskiness raises the marginal cost of
changing from nL to nH and therefore will not lead to increased indulgence.
If, however, n ˆ(p) 	 nL, then an increase in riskiness lowers the marginal
cost of changing from nL to nH, and therefore the person may now prefer
high indulgence to low indulgence. Of course, the increase in riskiness also
raises the total cost of engaging in the activity at levels nL and nH,s on o w
abstinence may be optimal. But, if r is suﬃciently high, the person will not
respond to greater risk by switching to abstinence, and, if s is suﬃciently
high—for instance, if initially the person was just indiﬀerent between en-
gaging in the activity nL versus nH times—then the increase in riskiness
will lead the person to switch from low indulgence to high indulgence.
This example illustrates the more general point that there are two pos-
sible reactions that a person might have to an increase in perceived riski-
ness. First, there is the intuitive reaction wherein the person reduces his
indulgence so as to avoid the bad outcome whose likelihood has increased.
But, second, there is a fatalistic reaction: the person instead might decide
that, because he is not willing to choose very low indulgence, the bad out-
come is now essentially unavoidable, and therefore he might as well in-
crease indulgence. If a young person is suﬃciently committed to some level
of sexual activity, then, if he comes to believe that the risk is greater, he
may increase his activity. If an adolescent perceives that, once she uses
drugs, she will surely become an addict, then she is likely to use drugs a
great deal if she uses them at all. More generally, for any activity in which
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perceived riskiness can potentially lead to increased indulgence.
This fatalistic reaction relies on two key assumptions. First, it must be
that, given the amount in which the person might plausibly want to in-
dulge, the probability of harm done is not negligible. Second, as we assume
throughout, the eventuality being risked must be all or nothing rather than
cumulative—that is, if the bad thing happens once, then it either cannot
happen again or will not cause much further harm if it does occur.
We do not have a strong empirical sense of whether, for realistic beneﬁts
and risk levels, the fatalistic reaction identiﬁed above is likely to be impor-
tant within the rational-choice setting. As we shall discuss shortly, how-
ever, such fatalism is more likely to be important when a person suﬀers
from an overly strong taste for immediate gratiﬁcation or from projection
bias. Moreover, even within the rational-choice framework, a similar logic
applies on a more realistic level when adolescents choose among alterna-
tive activities, where the more pleasurable activities are also riskier. To
illustrate, suppose that an adolescent can engage in activities 1 and 2, at
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This contrived functional form implies that the activities are substitutes
for each other. In addition, again because of concave costs, the person will
do one of three things: engage in neither activity, engage in level n of activ-
i t y1 ,o re n g a g ei nl e v e ln of activity 2. Suppose that the risks associated
with the two activities are p1 and p2 and that the expected cost to the
person is given by C(n1, n2; p1, p2)  [1  (1  p1)n1(1  p2)n2].H e n c e ,
these activities are substitutes not only in terms of the beneﬁts that they
supply, but also in terms of the risks that they carry. Finally, assume that
s  r but that p2  p1 so that activity 2 is both more enjoyable and riskier.
Suppose that, given some initial risks (p1, p2), the person chooses to
engage in level n of activity 1, and consider what happens when p1 in-
creases. If initially the person strictly prefers no activity to level n of activ-
ity 2, then the only possible change following an increase in the riskiness
of activity 1 is to no activity. But, if initially the person prefers level n of
activity 2 to no activity, then the only possible change following an in-
crease in the riskiness of activity 1 is to level n of activity 2.
This example illustrates the more general point that an increase in the
perceived riskiness of less risky behaviors can lead people not to abstain,
but rather to engage in riskier substitute behaviors. For instance, if young
gay men suddenly perceive oral sex to carry a larger risk of HIV infection
than they had thought, they may start engaging in riskier activities, such
as anal sex. Similarly, if young heterosexuals suddenly learn that even con-
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having unprotected sex.
While the rational-choice analysis of repeated risky choices yields some
important implications, additional insights are yielded by relaxing the as-
sumptions that people rationally perceive the probability consequences of
their actions and that people react optimally to such perceptions. We now
discuss these additional insights in general intuitive terms rather than with
a formal analysis.
Consider ﬁrst the case where people rationally foresee the probability
consequences of their actions but, along the lines discussed in sections 1.2
and 1.3 above, do not react optimally to these beliefs. When people make
repeated risky choices, overindulgence due to self-control problems and
projection bias becomes more pronounced. More precisely, when self-
control problems and projection bias cause overindulgence, the concavity
of C(n; p) exacerbates this overindulgence because the person perceives
further indulgence as less costly.
This basic idea can play itself out in a couple of ways. Sections 1.2 and
1.3 emphasize how naı ¨vete ´ about self-control problems and projection bias
can lead to failures of self-management: people fail to avoid situations in
which they will not be able to resist indulgence. Because each choice to
indulge in a series of risky choices reduces the costs of future indulgences,
each failure at self-management is potentially more harmful than if the
choice were made in isolation. For instance, while initially there might be
only a few situations in which adolescents cannot resist having sex, once
they have succumbed in such episodes, they will realize that having further
sex is less costly and will therefore succumb in even more situations.
Hence, naive self-control problems and projection bias can lead to an
eventual fatalism and therefore high levels of indulgence.
Sophistication about self-control problems overcomes such descents
into fatalistic consumption due to failures at self-management. But sophis-
tication can lead to overconsumption due to an up-front feeling of fatal-
ism. A person who is worried about future self-control problems may ex-
pect not to behave optimally in the future. Hence, even when the person
does not want to indulge moderately, he may pessimistically (but correctly)
predict that there will be a number of future occasions on which he will
not be able to control himself. Given the concavity of C(n; p), such pessi-
mism reduces the perceived cost of indulgence at any given moment and
hence makes indulgence more likely.27
We next consider the possibility that people have irrational beliefs about
the probability consequences of their actions. Suppose that, given some
level of an activity n, the true likelihood of the bad outcome is (n; p)b u t
27. As in our analysis in sec. 1.2 above, whether awareness of self-control problems helps
or hurts a person here depends on the speciﬁcs of the environment.
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initially focus on errors induced by the incorrect perception of risk per se
and therefore assume that the person does not depart in any other way
from full rationality.
The simplest form of incorrect risk perceptions is that adolescents may
incorrectly perceive the riskiness, p, of each episode of the activity. If they
believe that each indulgence carries with it probability p ˆ  p of incurring
the bad outcome, then their perceived risk function will be  ˆ(n)  (n; p ˆ).
For instance, the folk wisdom that adolescents have a false sense of invul-
nerability might be conceptualized as perceiving p ˆ 	 p.28 For an otherwise
fully rational person, this error would cause the same eﬀects on behavior
as a decrease in the true riskiness. Hence, following the logic outlined
above, while feelings of invulnerability might have the intuitive eﬀect of
causing the person to engage in more of the activity, it can in fact decrease
how often he engages in the activity if he becomes (falsely) convinced that
he has not doomed himself by engaging in moderate amounts of the ac-
tivity.
Unfortunately, there is evidence that people, especially youths, have a
more extreme form of irrational belief: quite apart from incorrectly per-
ceiving the true risk per episode of an activity, adolescents think that the
probability function is more concave in n than it actually is—in our nota-
tion,  ˆ(n) is more concave than (n; p). For instance, Linville, Fischer, and
Fischhoﬀ (1993) ﬁnd that college students wildly exaggerate the chance of
acquiring HIV from one sexual encounter but then think that the chance
of acquiring it from ten sexual encounters is not much higher. In reality, for
the levels of heterosexual activity that are most common, the probability of
contracting HIV is approximately proportional to the number of sexual
encounters. This ﬁnding that people form probabilistic beliefs that are too
insensitive to the number of times in which they engage in an activity
accords well with the more general psychological phenomenon of dimin-
ishing sensitivity and what Kahneman (1994) has called extension neglect.
In a variety of domains, people are much less sensitive to the magnitude
of variables than they rationally ought to be. For instance, in deciding
ahead of time how burdensome having to walk to a hotel with suitcases
will be, people are more sensitive to having to walk three blocks versus
two blocks than they are to having to walk twenty blocks versus nineteen
blocks. This heuristic that the diﬀerence between nineteen and twenty is
smaller than the diﬀerence between two and three may be correct in most
environments, but in some environments—such as walking with suit-
cases—it is quite inappropriate. In the context of risky choice, diminishing
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28. We remind the reader that, while such feelings of invulnerability are commonly associ-
ated with youths, there is very little evidence supporting this conventional wisdom, and there
are some ways in which youths seem to overestimate the risks.sensitivity, taken literally and to its extreme, suggests that people are likely
vastly to underestimate the risk of all but the ﬁrst time they engage in
some activity.
This error can be expected to have the same general eﬀect that overesti-
mating p has. Because people overestimate the perceived risk from engag-
ing in the activity a few times, it may induce abstinence. But, if people
cannot resist indulging to some degree, an undersensitivity to the number
of times that they indulge may lead them to indulge a great deal. Taking
the results in Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoﬀ (1993) literally, for instance,
and assuming that acquiring HIV is the only risk from sex, then we would
expect their subjects to have unsafe sex quite a lot or not at all.
Because the discussion presented above of irrational beliefs assumes
that people react optimally to these beliefs, our conclusions about behavior
represent departures from what would be optimal given the true risk
(n; p). In other words, if we let W[ ˆ(n)|(n; p)] be the true well-being of
a person who optimizes with respect to beliefs  ˆ(n) when the true risk is
(n; p), then W[ ˆ(n)|(n; p)] 
 W[(n; p)|(n; p) ] .I f ,h o w e v e r ,ap e r s o n
suﬀers from other psychological errors, false risk beliefs can interact with
these other errors. While the behavioral implications of the false beliefs
discussed above do not change, these eﬀects can exacerbate or counteract
other errors that people make. Indeed, a common theme in psychological
research is that irrational beliefs can help rather than hurt a person in
many situations. Along these lines, we believe that it is important to under-
stand how false beliefs interact with self-control problems and projection
bias.
Because self-control problems and projection bias generally lead to
overindulgence, false beliefs help when they lead to less indulgence and
hurt when they lead to more indulgence. Whether falsely believing that the
risk function is more concave than it really is (because people exaggerate
the riskiness of the activity or suﬀer from extension neglect) helps or hurts
depends crucially on the degree to which the person is enticed by the activ-
ity. Exaggerated beliefs about risk may help if they make it so that the
person is able to resist even the strongest temptations. If, for instance, the
perceived risk of a single sexual encounter is suﬃciently exaggerated, it
may help a person with self-control problems refrain altogether. But, if
there are likely to be a number of occasions on which the person cannot
resist, then false beliefs in the direction of more concavity can exacerbate
overindulgence.
1.5 General Discussion
In this section, we attempt to tie together our analysis by brieﬂy dis-
cussing some empirical and policy implications.
Our focus in this chapter has been the potential for applying formal
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youthful behavior. While there is a broad range of issues from both psy-
chology and economics that are relevant to the behavior of adolescents,
we discuss only a few speciﬁc topics. Nonetheless, we believe that the er-
rors that we discuss may go a long way toward understanding excessive
risk taking by adolescents.
Behavioral-economic models abandon those features of the classical
economic model that psychological evidence indicates are wrong, such as
the assumption that discounting is time consistent. But behavioral-
economic models incorporate the features of the rational-choice model
that are realistic, such as the assumption that people generally pursue sat-
isfying rather than unsatisfying activities. Indeed, almost all the qualitative
empirical results that are lauded as support for the rational-choice
model—such as prices aﬀecting consumption of addictive goods—are
consistent with the behavioral models that we discuss and with all other
behavioral models with which we are familiar.29
Although in many instances the rational-choice model and behavioral
models both make correct qualitative predictions, in those same instances
behavioral models make sounder quantitative predictions and can better
explain observed behaviors with reasonable parameter values. For ex-
ample, while the rational-choice model can explain certain observed pat-
terns of consumption of addictive products, this explanation often seems
to require absurd levels of impatience. Because even small departures from
the rational-choice model can lead to signiﬁcant quantitative changes in
behavior, the same observed patterns of consumption that require absurd
levels of impatience when viewed through the lens of rational choice can
be explained, for instance, by reasonable levels of impatience and a small
self-control problem.
There is, however, an important qualitative implication of our models
that is diﬀerent from the rational-choice model: systematic incorrect pre-
dictions of future behavior. The rational-choice model permits incorrect
predictions due to uncertainty but rules out any systematic bias in these
incorrect predictions. By contrast, the behavioral models that we discuss
above suggest systematic incorrect predictions. Naı ¨vete ´ about self-control
problems yields a systematic underestimation of future indulgence. Projec-
29. Research proposing behavioral alternatives to the classical economic model is often
designed to persuade the audience of the truth and usefulness of the behavioral alternatives
and therefore typically emphasizes how the behavioral alternatives make distinct compara-
tive-static predictions from the classical economic model. Since such persuasion is one of
our goals, we, too, discuss comparisons. But we also emphasize that there is overwhelming
support for the assumption that people have a time-inconsistent preference for immediate
gratiﬁcation and strong support for the assumption that people suﬀer from projection bias.
Hence, we do not limit ourselves solely to comparisons of comparative-static predictions
but instead focus more on the direct goal of understanding the implications of these true
behavioral assumptions.
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tion is more environment speciﬁc. Consider, for example, projection bias
over the addictiveness of cigarettes. An unaddicted person projects her
current low craving onto her future preferences and therefore tends to un-
derestimate future consumption. An addicted person, on the other hand,
projects her current high craving onto her future preferences, which moves
her toward overestimation of future consumption.
Evidence of systematic incorrect predictions therefore provides some
support for these models. A direct approach to investigating such incorrect
predictions is to ask people to predict future behavior and then later com-
pare predictions to actual behavior. This approach is commonly used in
psychological research, and, in fact, systematic incorrect predictions are
often found; much of the evidence for projection bias was exactly such evi-
dence.
For economists unwilling to infer anything from self-reported predic-
tions, however, a second approach is to look for situations in which a per-
son’s behavior provides information about her predictions of future behav-
ior. As a contrived example, consider how a ﬁfteen-year-old might react
diﬀerently to two diﬀerent changes in the pricing scheme for cigarettes:
Plan A. The price of cigarettes is permanently increased by ﬁfty cents
per pack.
Plan B. There is no change in the price of cigarettes, but to buy cigarettes,
a person must purchase an access card for an up-front fee of $500.
If the ﬁfteen-year-old were asked which of these plans she would prefer,
her answer would reveal her beliefs about how much she expects to smoke.
In particular, since $500 is less than three years of ﬁfty cents per day, pre-
ferringoptionAsuggeststhattheﬁfteen-year-olddoesnotplantobesmok-
ing for more than three years, and preferring option B suggests that she
does not plan to be smoking for fewer than three years.
Suppose that there are two types of states, those that implement plan A
and those that implement plan B, and consider how the behavior of ﬁfteen-
year-olds would diﬀer across the two types of states. In particular, consider
what the rational-choice model has to say about the states in which we
would expect to see more ﬁfteen-year-olds become long-term smokers. Ra-
tional actors facing little uncertainty plan to be either nonsmokers, short-
term smokers, or long-term smokers and then stick to their plans. Because
the price of long-term smoking is lower and the price of short-term smok-
ing is higher in plan B states, the rational-choice model predicts that more
ﬁfteen-year-olds become long-term smokers in plan B states.
In contrast, if people underestimate future consumption owing either to
naı ¨vete ´ about self-control problems or to projection bias, then we could
expect to see fewer ﬁfteen-year-olds become long-term smokers in plan B
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short-term smokers, or long-term smokers, our models suggest that there
will also be people who plan to be short-term smokers but end up being
long-term smokers. Although, just as in the rational-choice model, there
is a tendency for more people to plan long-term smoking in plan B states,
the higher cost of short-term smoking in plan B states deters people from
planning short-term smoking and ending up as long-term smokers. This
latter eﬀect could dominate when underestimation is large.
More realistic empirical tests comparing our models to rational-choice
models revolve around how people react both to changes in short-term
costs and beneﬁts and to changes in long-term costs and beneﬁts. For in-
stance, suppose that there is an improvement in detox programs that re-
duces the long-term cost of becoming addicted. According to the rational-
choice model, such a change should lead to many people becoming ad-
dicted because many prospective addicts should now be enticed by the
lower cost of addiction. When people underestimate their likelihood of
becoming addicted, however, such a change would have less eﬀect because
the marginal consumer who ends up in the detox program is unlikely to
have been planning to get addicted.
We conclude with some brief and speculative discussion of the policy
implicationsofouranalysis.Whilethesimpliﬁednatureofouranalysispre-
ventsitsconﬁdentuseforspeciﬁcpolicyprescriptions,somegeneralthemes
emergefor eachof thetwo approachesthat societyoften considersfor com-
batting excessive risk taking by adolescents, regulation and education.
The main theme of our analysis is that youths do not react optimally to
the intrinsic costs and beneﬁts that they face. Because so many of the risky
behaviors studied in this volume involve short-term beneﬁts and long-term
costs, providing short-term rewards for good behavior may be quite impor-
tant. Policy can be designed to manipulate incentives to better align their
perceived immediate incentives with their actual long-term goals.
Our analysis also suggests that one of the major problems that youths
have is that they fail to recognize when current indulgence will lead to
future indulgence. Hence, policy makers should perhaps create incentives
that encourage youths to take into account the linkages between decisions.
By making youths pay a large sum up front for the right to begin smok-
ing, for instance, plan B discussed above may provide an alternative tax-
incentive scheme that will force adolescent smokers to decide whether they
want to be smokers when they begin their habit rather than paying incre-
mentally as in plan A. While there are, of course, some practical limits to
this approach, an appealing feature of such incentives is that they would
presumably do relatively little harm to those youths who are rationally
taking up the career of smoking—who correctly realize that $500 up front
is worth the lifetime of pleasure—while preventing smoking among those
who might be developing the smoking habit unintentionally.
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adolescents were fully rational and caused no harm to others by their risky
behavior, then the optimal education policy would be to provide them with
as much accurate information as possible. If youths make errors, in con-
trast, there may be a role for “propaganda” aimed at misleading adoles-
cents about the true risks involved in their activities. There are many rea-
sons that society and government might wish only to tell the truth, from
moral disposition to worries about loss of credibility. But, even under the
constraints of only telling the truth, there is usually scope for what to
emphasize. Our analysis can provide some insights into the types of truth-
ful or untruthful education campaigns that might be most useful.
Raising perceptions of the severity of bad outcomes is likely to have a
direct and desired eﬀect. Exaggerating the costs of being pregnant, acquir-
ing AIDS, being jailed for committing a crime, or being addicted is likely
to diminish risky behaviors and, hence, improve the welfare of adolescents.
In a real-world example of this approach, a recent poster used by the state
of California to discourage young men from smoking shows a cigarette
drooping, connoting a high risk of sexual dysfunction from smoking. Pre-
sumably, the state of California believed that sexual dysfunction will regis-
ter to the target audience as a more salient cost than (say) lung cancer.
Whereas raising perceptions of the severity of bad outcomes is likely to
have the desired eﬀects, our analysis in section 1.4 above suggests that
raising perceptions of the likelihood of bad outcomes is not guaranteed
to reduce risk-taking behavior. A wariness of exaggerating dangers as a
means of discouraging risky behavior is especially warranted in situations
in which an adolescent is choosing among substitute risky behaviors.
Preaching the dangers of marijuana use can cause more harm than good
if it induces young people who use marijuana to exaggerate the degree to
which their lives are ruined already and hence to underestimate the addi-
tional harm of cocaine or, worse yet, if it leads them to substitute cocaine
for marijuana to begin with. This issue is very much on the minds of at
least some of those working to discourage risky behavior. There is frequent
debate in the gay press, for instance, about whether to emphasize the dan-
gers of acquiring HIV through unprotected oral sex. Some have argued
that even truthful emphasis on the dangers of oral sex might lead gay men
to engage in unprotected anal sex under the premise that they are at great
risk unless they refrain from sexual activity altogether, which they are un-
willing to do.
Our policy prescriptions are not very speciﬁc or concrete because our
analysis draws out general principles rather than speciﬁc implications. Re-
search aimed at developing practical policies to combat risky behaviors
must be based on analyses that are far more context speciﬁc and empiri-
cally grounded than ours has been. We hope, however, that by discussing
some important lessons from behavioral economics and their potential im-
64 Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabinplications for risky behavior, we have helped lay the groundwork for such
research.
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